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2021-2023

**ARCTIC COUNCIL**  
RUSSIA'S CHAIRMANSHIP

# MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE ARCTIC THROUGH THE LENS OF INTERNATIONAL ARCTIC ORGANIZATIONS: A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

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## 1. Trends in Arctic cooperation in recent decades

The Arctic is a unique region where the effects of climate change manifest themselves beyond its borders - all the challenges of the Arctic region are transboundary<sup>1</sup>. At the same time, melting of the Arctic Sea ice expands economic opportunities for the states, for example, prospects for the development of shipping and the oil industry improve. To deal with the challenges and problems in the Arctic, the states are building bilateral and multilateral channels of interaction, gradually forming the region's international legal regime and institutionalizing international cooperation on Arctic governance. A primary role in shaping the system of institutions in the region is played by the Arctic Five countries: Russia, the United States, Canada, Norway, and Denmark, which are the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean<sup>2</sup>. Together with the Arctic Five countries, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, which have territories beyond the polar circle, participate in the Arctic governance, forming the Arctic Eight.

The legal regime of the Arctic began to take shape in the 20th century: in 1982, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea<sup>3</sup> was adopted, establishing the procedure for joint and sovereign management of maritime territories, including the Arctic. Article 234 enshrined the right of coastal countries to adopt national laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within their exclusive economic zones.

In 1991, the Arctic Eight adopted the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy to jointly address the region's environmental problems<sup>4</sup>. In 2008 "The Arctic Five recognized the Convention as a framework document within the international regulation of the Arctic region<sup>5</sup>, and also adopted the Ilulissat Declaration, which formalized the decision of the states to cooperate on an equal basis to solve problems arising in the region<sup>6</sup>.

A milestone in the development of Arctic cooperation was the signing of the Ottawa Declaration by eight Arctic countries and the subsequent establishment of **the Arctic Council**, which has become a fundamental forum for interaction between states and other actors to jointly

1 Mikhailova T.A., Mikhailov K.S. International cooperation of Russia in the Arctic region in the international legal field // Socio-economic research, humanities and jurisprudence: theory and practice. -2016. -№5. -C. 101-109.

2 Rabia Kalfaoglu. Organizations and Forms of Cooperation in the Arctic Region // Vestnik (Herald) of Moscow University. -2018. -№6. -C. 66-77.

3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea // United Nations.

URL: [https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos\\_e.pdf](https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf) (accessed 26.04.2022)

4 Rabia Kalfaoglu. Organizations and Forms of Cooperation in the Arctic Region// Bulletin of Moscow University. -2018. -№6. -C. 66-77.

5 Voronov K. Arctic Horizons of Russia's Strategy: Current Dynamics// World Economy and International Relations. -2010. -№ 9. -C. 54-65.

6 Five countries adopted a declaration on cooperation in the Arctic // Lenta.ru. URL: <https://lenta.ru/news/2008/05/29/arctic/> (access date: 02.06.2022)



address the region's problems. Permanent participants of the platform are the Arctic Eight countries and six associations of indigenous peoples of the North: the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Aleut International Association, the Gwich'in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Federation Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East, and the Saami Council<sup>7</sup>. There are 38 other countries and organizations that participate in the Arctic Council as observers, including the states without territories in the Arctic region, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary bodies (Nordic Council of Ministers, UN Development Program, UN Environment Program, etc.) and non-governmental organizations (Association of World Reindeer Herders, World Wildlife Fund, University of the Arctic, etc.). Since the creation of the organization, many countries without territories in the region have been granted observer status: first they were the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain, and later (in 2007 and 2013) - Italy, China, India, Japan, Rep. Korea and Singapore.

Over the years, the status of the platform began to change and strengthen, indicating the interest of countries around the world, including Asian states, in solving the problems of the region on the basis of international institutions, i.e. the process of institutional globalization of the Arctic began<sup>8</sup>. At the same time, due to the rapid melting of the Arctic ice, the issue of changing the status of Arctic waters is gradually arising. From exclusive economic zones of the Arctic states, they will cease to fall under Article 234 of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Discussions about the possible revision of the status of the Arctic Ocean waters are already going on in the USA, both within the framework of governmental commissions and on the platforms of think tanks, for example the Wilson Center<sup>9</sup>.

The activities of the Arctic Council as a fundamental platform for international cooperation in the region are aimed at cooperation between states in such areas as: Arctic indigenous peoples, biodiversity conservation, combating climate change and environmental protection, pollution of the global ocean, prevention and management of emergencies.

Direct interaction between Arctic Council members and observers takes place in **six working groups**<sup>10</sup>:

- The Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) Working Group;
- Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) working group;
- Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (CAFF);

7 Permanent Participants // Arctic Council. URL: <https://arctic-council.org/ru/about/permanent-participants/> (accessed 26.05.2022)

8 Konyshov V.N., Sergunin A.A. International Organizations and Cooperation in the Arctic // Bulletin of International Organizations. -2011. -№ 3. -C. 27-36.

9 The New Arctic: Navigating the Realities, Possibilities, and Challenges // Wilson Center. URL: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-new-arctic-navigating-the-realities-possibilities-and-challenges> (accessed 26.05.2022)

10 Arctic Council Working Groups // Arctic Council. URL: <https://arctic-council.org/ru/about/working-groups/> (accessed 26.05.2022)



- Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group (EPRP);
- Working Group for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME);
- Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).

Each of the working groups implements both multilateral and bilateral projects in the region. At the same time, task forces may be created to address specific tasks<sup>11</sup>, and there is also an expert group on “black carbon and methane” (Black Carbon and Methane Expert Group), which since 2015 is engaged in the evaluation of the Arctic Council’s Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane (the Arctic Council’s Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane)<sup>12</sup>. Asian states, acting as observers in the organization, take part in the projects of the working groups: Japan, the PRC, India, the Republic of Korea and Singapore are involved in the CAFF project Actions for Arctic biodiversity<sup>13</sup> (SDG 13 - Combat Climate Change, SDG 14 - Life Below Water, SDG 15 - Conservation of Terrestrial Ecosystems), the Arctic Migratory Birds Initiative<sup>14</sup>, and Japan, China, and Korea in the Sustaining Arctic observing networks AMAP project<sup>15</sup>.

The Arctic Council’s Strategic Plan 2021-2030 has now been approved<sup>16</sup>, which prioritizes climate change (SDG 13 - Combat Climate Change) and pollution of Arctic ecosystems (SDG 15 - Preserve Terrestrial Ecosystems), protection of the Arctic marine environment (SDG 14 - Life Below Water) as priority goals until the end of the decade, sustainable social and economic development (SDG 3 - Good Health and Well-being, SDG 9 - Industrialization, Innovation and Infrastructure), and strengthening the Arctic Council as a cooperative mechanism (SDG 17 - Partnership for Sustainable Development).

Every two years, one of the eight member states of the Arctic Council takes over the chairmanship. In 2021-2023, this role has shifted from Iceland (2019-2021)<sup>17</sup> to the Russian Federation, which has made “Responsible Governance for a Sustainable Arctic” a priority of its presidency and has set tasks to promote international cooperation in 4 areas: 1) Arctic people, including indigenous peoples, 2) environmental protection, including climate change issues, 3) socio-economic development, and 4) strengthening the Arctic Council<sup>18</sup>. Thus, many of the Arctic Council’s goals and activities are long-term and are consistently implemented within various initiatives and projects.

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- 11 Krasnopolsky B.Kh. Coordination of International Organizations of the North Arctic Regions: Toward the Program of the Russian Federation Chairmanship in the Arctic Council // The Arctic and the North. -2020. -N941. -C. 148-162.
- 12 Arctic Council Expert Groups // Arctic Council. URL: <https://arctic-council.org/ru/about/task-expert/> (accessed 26.05.2022)
- 13 Actions for Arctic Biodiversity 2013-2021 // Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna. URL: <https://www.caff.is/actions-for-arctic-biodiversity-2013-2021> (accessed 26.07.2022)
- 14 Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane // Arctic Council. 2017. URL: [https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1936/EGBCM\\_Executive\\_Summary\\_RU.pdf?sequence=10&isAllowed=y](https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1936/EGBCM_Executive_Summary_RU.pdf?sequence=10&isAllowed=y) (accessed 26.07.2022)
- 15 Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks // Arctic Observing. URL: <https://www.arcticobserving.org> (accessed 10.08.2022)
- 16 Arctic Council Strategic Plan // Arctic Council. 2021. URL: <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/2601> (accessed 26.05.2022)
- 17 Past Chairmanships // Arctic Council. URL: <https://arctic-council.org/about/previous-chairmanships/> (accessed 26.05.2022)
- 18 Russian Chairmanship. Russia’s Chairmanship Program for the Arctic Council 2021-2023 // Russian Chairmanship. 2021. URL: <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/2646> (accessed 26.05.2022)



To strengthen cooperation within the Arctic Council, several legally binding agreements were adopted: the Agreement on Cooperation in Aviation and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011)<sup>19</sup>, the Agreement on Cooperation in Preparedness and Response to Marine Oil Pollution in the Arctic (2013)<sup>20</sup>, the Agreement on Enhancing International Scientific Cooperation in the Arctic (2017)<sup>21</sup>. The adoption of these documents, coupled with the development of the platform itself, indicates a consistent movement toward establishing the Arctic Council as a full-fledged international organization. The legally binding agreements also enhance the legitimacy of the Arctic Council as the main institution for governing the Arctic<sup>22</sup>.

While the Arctic Council is a central element of the Arctic governance architecture, there are also other platforms for international cooperation in the region: the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council, the Northern Dimension, EU Cross-Border Cooperation Programs, the University of the Arctic, and others.

The Barents Euro-Arctic Council plays a key role in multilateral cooperation in the European part of Arctic. It was established in 1993, and its permanent members are Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Russia, Sweden and the European Commission. Norway, Finland, Russia and Sweden take turns in the presidency of the organization: in 2021-2023, Finland takes over that role. As in the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council has working groups responsible for cooperation between the countries in certain areas: health and social services, science and education, culture, forestry, tourism, transport and logistics, entrepreneurship, environmental protection, support for indigenous peoples in the Arctic, youth support, and cooperation in rescue operations.

The Barents/Euro-Arctic Council also has a Regional Council of 13 entities from different states, with a rotating presidency every two years by an administrative entity. The Nenets Autonomous Okrug of the Russian Federation (NAO) holds the presidency from 2021 to 2023, with the priorities for the next 2 years set as increasing cross-border mobility in the Barents region, developing a diversified and sustainable economy, including tourism, improving the quality of life of the indigenous population and developing human capital, in particular by creating comfortable living conditions<sup>23</sup>.

Another initiative for international cooperation in **the Arctic is the Northern Dimension**<sup>24</sup>, which is a joint policy of four actors: the EU, Russia, Norway, and Iceland, implemented through four partnerships. They focus on the environment (SDG 13 - Combat Climate change, SDG 14 - Life Below Water SDG 15 - Preserve Terrestrial Ecosystems), public health and well-being (SDG

19 Arctic Council Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. 2011.

URL: <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531> (accessed 4.11.2022)

20 Arctic Council Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. 2013.

URL: <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/529> (accessed 4.11.2022)

21 Arctic Council Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. 2017.

URL: <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1916> (accessed 4.11.2022)

22 Sokolova N. A. International Arctic scientific cooperation: institutionalization of the legal regime//Actual problems of Russian law. -2020. №9 (118). -C. 120-130

23 About the Regional Council // Barents Euro-Arctic Council.

URL: <https://www.barents-council.org/barents-regional-council/about-the-council> (accessed 26.05.2022)

24 Northern Dimension URL: <https://northerndimension.info/ru/o-nas/> (accessed 26.05.2022)



3 - Good Health and Well-being), transport and logistics (SDG 9 - Industrialization, Innovation and Infrastructure) and culture. The strategic relationship between the EU and Russia plays a special role in the initiative, since many projects are being implemented in the northwestern part of Russia due to the acute environmental threats in these territories. Through cooperation within the Northern Dimension, Russia and the EU, as the two most important political actors, could develop good neighborly relations, which increased the importance of the platform for its participants<sup>25, 26</sup>.

**Cross-Border Cooperation programs (CBCs)** in the Arctic are EU policies aimed at cooperation with other states with territories in the Arctic region. Such CBCs as Kolarctic, Karelia and Russia-Southeast Finland have been in operation since 2007<sup>27</sup>. Their goal was to strengthen sustainable development in certain regions of the Arctic states - Finland, Norway, Sweden and Russia.

A major platform for international scientific cooperation in **the Arctic is the University of the Arctic (UArctic)**, which brings together scientific centers of the Arctic states and Arctic Council observer countries, including Asian states: China (Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences, Chinese Environmental Research Institute, Institute of Polar Research of China, Harbin Institute of Technology), India (National Center for Polar and Oceanic Research of the Indian Ministry of Land Affairs), Japan (Hokkai University), and the Russian Federation. An active role in the Arctic region is played by the International Arctic Science Committee, in which Asian countries also participate. This committee conducts research on the cryosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere, and social issues (SDG 13 - Combat Climate Change, SDG 14 - Life Below Water, and SDG 15 - Preserve Terrestrial Ecosystems).

Thus, over time, more platforms with different actor coverage and international cooperation focus in the region have emerged. However, in the existing platforms, the defense sphere was always left out of the agenda.

The international legal regime in the Arctic is also complemented by a set of multilateral agreements. In 2018, the coastal Arctic states as well as Iceland, China, South Korea, Japan and EU signed an agreement "On the Prevention of Unregulated Fishing on the High Seas in the Central Arctic Ocean<sup>28</sup>", which bans commercial fishing for the five Arctic states until accurate information about the state of fish stocks and the region's ecosystem is available. This is how countries prevent the depletion of fish resources in the Arctic and use them sustainably (SDG 12 - Responsible

25 Bailes A. J. K. The EU Crossing Arctic Frontiers: The Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Northern Dimension, and EU-West Nordic Relations// Brill, -2017. -P. 40-62.

26 Markushina, N. Y. The Northern Dimension: Russia and the EU - Issues of Relevance // Advances in Modern Science. - 2016. - T. 9. - № 12. - C. 182-185.

27 Russia and the EU signed new programs of cross-border cooperation // EEAS Website. URL: [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/38395\\_ru](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/38395_ru) (accessed 27.05.2022)

28 Agreement on Prevention of Unregulated Fishing in the High Seas in the Central Arctic Ocean (entered into force for the Russian Federation on June 25, 2021) // Official Internet portal of legal information. URL: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202106280035> (date of reference: 25.07.2022)



Consumption and Production). Along with many states, including Asian states, the Arctic Eight countries also ratified in turn the Polar Code on the regulation of navigation in Arctic waters, which came into force in 2017 (SDG 12 - Responsible Consumption and Production, SDG 14 - Life Below Water).

However, international cooperation in the region has now slowed down considerably, and in some aspects it has paused. In early 2022, the SDWG released the State of Knowledge Report on Renewable Economies in the Arctic, but in March 2022, international cooperation within the framework of the Arctic Council was suspended, and no new activities in the forum working groups took place. Member states of the forum (with the exception of Russia) refused to participate in the events of the organization and in the activities of its bodies<sup>29</sup>. In June, the same countries, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and the U.S., decided to resume cooperation without Russia, not in all activities of the forum, but only in those projects within the working groups, where the Russian Federation is not involved<sup>30</sup>. Some observer countries, such as China, have openly expressed their disagreement with this position of the Arctic states, pointing to the impossibility of the forum functioning without Russia as its fundamental participant<sup>31</sup>. China's special representative in the Arctic, Feng Gao, expressed China's position: "There is no procedure for leaving the council. I doubt that the chairmanship can be transferred to anyone or that Norway can take over the chair without Russia from a legal point of view"<sup>32</sup>.

At the same time Russia continues its program within the framework of its chairmanship in the Arctic Council. From February to early October 2022 Russia held more than 24 events in 4 areas, which were identified as priorities for the period of its presidency. For example, the Conference on Adaptation to Climate Change in the Arctic and the Conference on Waste and Microplastics in the Arctic took place in July<sup>33</sup>.

In March 2022, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies suspended cooperation with the Russian Federation, but an official joint statement of the Council participants (Denmark, Finland, EU, Iceland, Norway, Sweden) stressed that international cooperation in the Arctic cannot succeed without Russia and the organization itself cannot function effectively without one of its most important members<sup>34</sup>. Despite this, the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council continued its activities

29 Foreign Ministry called the decision of the Arctic Council to suspend the work irrational // RIA Novosti.

URL: <https://ria.ru/20220304/sovet-1776541667.html> (access date: 02.06.2022)

30 Joint Statement on Limited Resumption of Arctic Council Cooperation // U. S. Department of State.

URL: <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-limited-resumption-of-arctic-council-cooperation/> (accessed 11.11.2022)

31 China: "Will Not Acknowledge Arctic Council Without Russia" // High North News.

URL: <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/china-will-not-acknowledge-arctic-council-without-russia> (accessed 11.11.2022)

32 Ibid

33 Calendar // Arctic Council. URL: <https://arctic-council-russia.ru/calendar/?date=110&type=> (accessed 11.11.2022)

34 Statements regarding Barents Euro-Arctic cooperation // The Barents Euro-Arctic Council.

URL: <https://www.barents-council.org/news/joint-statement-of-finland-denmark-iceland-norway-sweden-and-the-european-union-regarding-barents-euro-arctic-cooperation> (accessed 11.11.2022)

after March 2022. The Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Natural Resources Centre (Luke) are creating a new project to raise awareness of harmful alien species and the threats they pose to the unique Arctic environment of the Barents region in Finland, Sweden and Norway<sup>35</sup>.

Northern Dimension members - the EU, Norway and Iceland also suspended cooperation with Russia in March 2022<sup>36</sup>. Thereafter, as of November 2022, no official statements on the continuation of old projects or the creation of new ones have been published on the platform website.

Cooperation with Russia has also been suspended under the three Cross-Border Cooperation Programs (CBP) with the EU in the Arctic, but the Karelia CBP program continues with EU and Norwegian participation<sup>37</sup>. The European Commission has also decided that the budget previously allocated for the already closed programmes should be reallocated<sup>38</sup>. Cooperation with Russia and Russian institutions in the framework of the University of the Arctic and the International Arctic Science Committee was also suspended in 2022, but they independently continue their work, organizing events and projects.

Russia's exclusion from Arctic institutions as a result of the current geopolitical crisis on the condition of its unilateral participation in the continuation of the Arctic Council demonstrates the fragmentation of the Arctic governance system, a process that began even before February 2022. For a long time, the US has viewed Russia, as well as China in the Arctic, as a threat to its national security. This US position is reflected not only in the rhetoric of former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo<sup>39</sup>. A special role in the confrontation between Russia and the United States is played by China, whose presence in the Arctic has only increased over the years. China is in favor of expanding the circle of states participating in the management of the Arctic, calling itself a "near-arctic" state, but the United States is wary of the growing influence of this country in the region. This leads to deeper cooperation between Russia and China in projects in the Arctic.

The gradual fragmentation of the region's governance system causes uncertainty in the further development of the Arctic governance system. The suspension of existing projects indicates a pause in international cooperation to address key problems and challenges in the Arctic, which, despite the economic and geopolitical crisis, have not disappeared, have not resolved themselves and still require active involvement of states.

35 New project by the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Natural Resources Center. URL: <https://www.barents-council.org/news/new-project-by-the-finnish-ministry-of-agriculture-and-forestry-and-the-natural-resources-center> (accessed 11.11.2022)

36 Northern Dimension Policy: Joint Statement by the European Union, Iceland and Norway on suspending activities with Russia and Belarus // Northern Dimension. URL: <https://northerndimension.info/northern-dimension-policy-joint-statement-by-the-european-union-iceland-and-norway-on-suspending-activities-with-russia-and-belarus/> (accessed 11.11.2022)


37 European Parliament. EU regional policy in the Arctic. URL: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729464/EPRS\\_BRI\(2022\)729464\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729464/EPRS_BRI(2022)729464_EN.pdf) (accessed 11. 11. 2022)

38 Ibid

39 United States Rattles Arctic Talks With a Sharp Warning to China and Russia //The New York Times. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/climate/pompeo-arctic-china-russia.html> (accessed 11. 11. 2022)

## 2. Scenarios for International Cooperation in the Arctic

The analysis of international cooperation in the Arctic is based on a set of scenarios developed by the research group of the Department of World Economy and World Politics of the National Research University Higher School of Economics to determine the medium-term prospects for overcoming the current economic and geopolitical crises<sup>40</sup>. This set of scenarios is determined by a combination of two key indicators - **the rate of world economic recovery and the degree of conflict in international relations for the period up to 2030** (Fig. 1). The pace of post-crisis recovery of the world economy is a key factor that determines the financial capacity of countries to get involved into international projects in the Arctic. At the same time the degree of conflict in international relations implies not only the degree of tension in relations between Russia and the West, including the severity of anti-Russian sanctions, but also the overall level of mistrust between countries, in particular the degree of divergence between the interests of the United States and China.



**Figure 1** - Scenarios for the development of the world economy and the system of international relations

**Source:** Compiled by a research group from the Department of World Economy and World Politics at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, based on the report "Conducting a Study of Russian Economic and Social Development Scenarios in the Context of Geopolitical Turbulence".

Based on the two key vectors of recovery from the current crisis and the trends in the interaction of the countries in the Arctic that have emerged in recent decades, four characteristics that characterize the direction of the development of the Arctic governance system have been formulated. They include the overall functionality of Arctic cooperation institutions, the degree of

<sup>40</sup> The development of scenarios is the result of the research work "Conducting a study of scenarios for the development of the Russian economy and social sphere under conditions of geopolitical turbulence", implemented as part of the strategic project of the National Center for Scientific-Technological and Socio-Economic Forecasting of the National Research University HSE in 2022.

involvement of non-Arctic countries in the Arctic institutions, the level of fragmentation of governance institutions and the degree of interest divergence between countries, and the priorities and sectoral focus of cooperation between countries.

Each scenario considers opportunities for building international cooperation: from continuing multilateral cooperation in existing formats to creation of new regional systems of interaction. Each scenario explores the possibilities of Russia's integration into the new architecture of the world order, which in each scenario appear to be feasible to a different extent. It also takes into account the probability of Russia's continued cooperation with Western countries and the development of partnerships with Asian countries in the face of sanctions.

### Functionality of International Institutions in the Arctic Region

The functionality of international institutions is characterized by the intensity and activity of various cooperation formats through the creation of new working groups, the implementation of medium- and long-term projects, and the conclusion of multilateral agreements that are subsequently executed. In addition, one of the conditions for increasing the functionality of the existing formats of cooperation is the participation of all Arctic Eight countries, including Russia as a key actor in the region.

In this regard, the low conflict of international relations may promote the establishment of cooperation and the restoration of political channels of interaction between the countries. As for Russia, it would be out of isolation and be able to cooperate within international platforms in the Arctic. Altogether it can provide better functionality of international institutions for the management of the Arctic. High conflict, on the contrary, may lead to the destruction of established channels of interstate interaction, which for Russia may be fraught with isolation and exclusion from international cooperation in the Arctic. It can result in further decline in the functionality of multilateral formats in the region.

The rapid recovery of the world economy may allow countries to engage in international cooperation in the Arctic due to a greater interest in the resource potential and transit opportunities of the Arctic region, which require enhanced international cooperation. Countries will have more financial resources to invest in Arctic projects, create new working groups and conclude new agreements, which may lead to higher functionality of international formats in the region. The slow recovery of the global economy from the recession will reduce the interest of states in further cooperation in the Arctic, as their priorities will be shifted to supporting national economies. Therefore, they will not have enough capital at their disposal to invest in projects in the Arctic region, which indicates a potential decrease in the functionality of international cooperation formats.

## Degree of Involvement of Non-Arctic Countries in Arctic Governance Institutions

The degree of involvement of non-Arctic countries in Arctic governance implies strengthening the positions of non-Arctic countries participating in the existing Arctic institutions, probable emergence of new members in key Arctic governance structures (the Arctic Council, the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council) and other platforms, their participation in major international initiatives in the Arctic, such as the Polar Code, and in new formats that may emerge in the region. This indicator takes into account the possible change in the status of non-Arctic countries in organizations, e.g., whether non-Arctic countries and nongovernmental organizations can be granted observer status. It also considers the participation of Asian states in the Arctic governance institutions and the possible emergence of new formats of cooperation with them, as well as the possible formation of preconditions for revising Article 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, arising as more and more actors become involved in the governance of the Arctic.

Low conflict in international relations probably makes the Arctic more “politically accessible” and allows new actors to get involved in the region’s governance, participate in established and new cooperation formats, and also to receive observer status in the Arctic Council and the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council. Given the high level of conflict in international relations, the channels of involvement of non-Arctic countries in the Arctic, including Asian countries, are significantly reduced. This is especially true for Russia’s Asian partners, China and India, which, with the high impact of secondary sanctions, are only hardly motivated to strengthen cooperation with Russia.

The rapid recovery of the global economy will allow non-Arctic countries to increase their presence in the Arctic by increasing global business activity and freeing up resources to invest in projects in the Arctic, while the slow recovery of the global economy to its pre-crisis state will rather hinder the participation of non-Arctic countries in cooperation formats in the region due to the urgent need to support national economies and resolve socio-economic crises at the local level.

## Degree of fragmentation of the system of management institutions

The fragmented system of governance institutions means that alternative blocks and formats can be formed in the Arctic with a limited number of actors with specific interests in the region. The high degree of confrontation, on the one hand, may reduce the opportunities for non-Arctic countries to be involved in the current Arctic governance institutions and significantly limit the institutional conditions for expanding the participants of the governance system within traditional cooperation formats, since this requires close cooperation between Arctic countries, including Russia. On the other hand, the high degree of confrontation due to the global value of the Arctic, the fragility and uniqueness of this region in the medium term will create prerequisites for the fragmentation of governance institutions, in which Western countries may take the leadership as Russia isolates itself. In this regard, with a high degree of conflict, it is more likely to build new channels of interaction,

which in the future will contribute to the formation of alternative venues with the participation of non-Arctic actors.

The rapid economic recovery may not directly contribute to increasing the fragmentation of the Arctic governance system but will create a material basis for building and strengthening ties between non-Arctic actors and Russia, while the slow return of the global economy to pre-crisis indicators may rather limit the possibility of creating alternative blocks.

### Priorities for international cooperation in the Arctic

Support for indigenous peoples, environmental protection, including climate change issues, have long been cross-cutting areas of activity for international Arctic governance institutions. In this regard, these areas will remain basic, regardless of the degree of global economic recovery. The rapid return of the economy to its pre-crisis growth trajectory will open opportunities for expanding the portfolio of projects, including setting the stage for long-term capital-intensive projects and agreements in infrastructure, digitalization, mining and technology transfer. Low conflict in international relations may create a basis for the active involvement of countries in different areas of activity, not limited to politically neutral issues of sustainable development, whereas high conflict may hinder the possibilities to cooperate in the technological, economic, and financial spheres, which are sensitive to changes in the political conjuncture.

**Table 1.** Matrix of scenarios for international cooperation in the Arctic

#### **S1 «Arctic Reset»**

- Functionality of international institutions - high
- Involvement of non-Arctic actors - high
- The fragmentation of the governing institutions system - low
- Areas of cooperation - environmental protection, socially oriented projects, economic, financial and technological cooperation

#### **S2 «Isolation of Russia»**

- Functionality of international institutions - low
- Involvement of non-Arctic actors - high
- Growing preconditions for higher fragmentation of Arctic governance
- Areas of cooperation - environmental protection, socially oriented projects



### **S3 «Arctic without borders»**

- Functionality of international institutions - high
- Involvement of non-Arctic actors - low
- Growing preconditions for higher fragmentation of Arctic governance
- Areas of cooperation - environmental protection, socially oriented projects, limited cooperation in financial, economic and technological spheres

### **S4 «Arctic Cooperation Stagnation»**

- Functionality of international institutions - low
- Involvement of non-Arctic actors - low
- The fragmentation of the governing institutions system - low
- Areas of cooperation - environmental protection, socially oriented projects

Possible scenarios for international cooperation in the Arctic are summarized in Appendix 1.

#### **Scenario 1 "Arctic Reset"**

This scenario assumes the most active development of international cooperation in the Arctic region. The high functionality of international organizations in the Arctic will be spurred by the fairly rapid recovery of the world economy and the readiness of countries to invest in new international projects. This will promote new international agreements in the Arctic, investment in existing projects and working groups of the Arctic Council, the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council, and the creation of new working groups with a narrower focus on the problems of the Arctic region, such as regulation of navigation in polar waters, related environmental damage and adaptation to climate change in the Arctic.

Given the low conflict nature of international relations, Russia once again may receive the opportunity to get involved in key structures of Arctic governance - the Arctic Council and the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council, which will also form conditions for increasing the functionality of these organizations and their importance through the participation in their activities of Russia, which has great political weight in the region. Russia's return to multilateral formats in the Arctic also means extending cross-border cooperation programs with the European Union, which are currently on hold - Kolarctic, Russia-Southeast Finland and Karelia. Given that the detailed content of these programs was worked out at the end of 2021, it is possible that the parties will be included in the implementation of the CBCs quite quickly. Russia's participation in international cooperation in the Arctic with the Arctic states will not only increase the weight of existing and new formats, but also may allow Russia to express its position on these platforms and significantly influence the Arctic agenda.

Since this scenario is characterized by low conflict in the international system, it opens a window of opportunity to involve non-Arctic states without current observer status in the Arctic



Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and other Arctic institutions. In addition, it is possible to involve them into new multilateral formats created with the participation of the Arctic states. In this scenario the involvement of Asian countries in the Arctic region, especially those who have observer status in the Arctic Council - China, India, R. Korea, Japan, and Singapore, will also continue. Despite the fairly long involvement of the Asian states in the governance of the Arctic, it is highly unlikely that there will be a qualitative change in their status in the region.

This scenario is distinguished by the low fragmentation of the system of Arctic governance institutions, which is largely due to fact that Russia is able to engage in previous cooperation formats and is perceived by other arctic states as a full-fledged actor in the Arctic, involved in joint solution of the region's problems within traditional formats. In this regard, the Arctic Council can maintain its role as the leading organization in the region, which in the long term creates conditions for the Arctic Council to form an international organization, increasing the binding nature and weight of its decisions. The low level of conflict will provide Russia with opportunities to strengthen its partnerships with China and India due to the much lesser pressure of secondary U.S. sanctions on these countries. Despite the intensification of international cooperation and the creation of new formats and platforms, weighty and functional platforms in opposition to the Arctic Council will probably not appear in this scenario.

Due to the low conflict nature of the international system and the weak sanctions pressure on Russia, international cooperation will not be limited to politically neutral issues of environmental protection and combating climate change, opportunities for economic, socio-cultural cooperation will be created, including support for indigenous and minority peoples of the North, technology transfer, joint scientific research and expeditions, improvement of the quality of healthcare in the region, and development of Arctic tourism. The rapid recovery of the global economy opens up opportunities to implement major projects in areas that require the most investment, primarily in the energy sector, including renewable energy (construction of wind farms, use of tidal energy and hydroelectric power plants), digitalization, in particular the development of satellite technologies to expand access to the Internet, creating conditions to attract business to the region, spreading telemedicine, developing infrastructure, and realizing the region's transport and logistics potential, especiallyю In this scenario, it is important for Russia to maintain technological transfer from Western countries, which will stimulate the creation of strategic advantages in new "green" industries, such as the production of hydrogen, various energy storage devices and electric transport, which will also improve the quality of life of the population of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.

As in this scenario partnership relations between Russia and Asian countries, especially India and China, will be potentially strengthen, it is likely to continue joint bilateral projects in mining, development of transport corridors, especially the Northern Sea Route, the corridor "Vladivostok-Chennai", serving as a bridge between the Russian Arctic, Far East and India, the route "North-South", development of satellite technology, Arctic monitoring, scientific research, etc. This scenario



will create conditions for establishing a political dialogue with these states, holding joint forums and events on the problems and prospects of the Arctic region development.

### Scenario 2 "Isolation of Russia"

This scenario assumes a rapid recovery of the global economy in a highly conflict-ridden international environment. Therefore, in this scenario Russia will be excluded from the key platforms of cooperation in the Arctic. By isolating a key player from the Arctic governance, the functionality of international organizations in the Arctic region, including the Arctic Council, will be reduced. Programs of cross-border cooperation with the EU - "Kolarctic", "Karelia" and "Russia-South-East Finland" - will be paused. It is likely that a small part of projects will be developed without Russian participation, including a number of projects in the Arctic Council and Barents/Euro-Arctic Council working groups. Various scientific cooperation platforms, e.g., the International Arctic Science Committee and the University of the Arctic, will continue their work, but the weight of these formats is likely to decrease due to the absence of Russia as a key actor in the region. Due to its isolation, Russia will be deprived of the opportunity to effectively defend its interests on international platforms in the Arctic.

As the global economy is rapidly returning to pre-crisis levels, conditions for the recovery of demand for energy resources and maritime transport routes are being built, which may allow non-Arctic countries to join the Arctic management system, create new working groups and participate in the implementation of new projects in the region. Asian countries will be actively involved in Arctic projects due to high economic growth rates, Russia's BRICS and SCO partners will generally be interested in cooperation in the Arctic, but their motivation for advanced interaction with Russia may be significantly reduced due to the secondary U.S. sanctions, which will narrow the window of opportunity for Russia to implement multilateral projects in the short term. Therefore, Russia can participate in Arctic governance only on a bilateral basis to a limited extent. It is possible to maintain a number of projects with friendly countries, including India and China, for example in the politically neutral field of scientific research and monitoring of Arctic ecosystems, as well as in energy sector, in which Russia's one-sided technological dependence on Asian countries (primarily China) will grow rapidly.

Russia's isolation from Arctic governance within traditional institutions along with the remaining interest of non-Arctic states in realizing the region's potential will lay the groundwork for the fragmentation of the governance system in the medium term given the dominance of the Western countries in international institutions on the Arctic.

The basic prerequisites of the scenario suggest that the range of priorities of cooperation in the Arctic will be narrowed and cover more politically neutral issues of sustainable development, including environmental protection, preservation of Arctic ecosystems and support for indigenous people of the Arctic, as well as the scientific cooperation which is largely necessary climate change mitigation in the region. Some opportunities to establish the Arctic monitoring system in the region,

mainly through existing Arctic Council projects and working groups will remain (working group on the elimination of pollution in the Arctic, on implementation of the Arctic monitoring and assessment program, on protection of the Arctic marine environment). The rapid recovery of the world economy will create conditions to implement a number of infrastructure projects necessary for the sustainable development of the Arctic territories, especially the development of digital technologies. Nevertheless, due to the high conflict, technological transfer will be limited affecting Russia, which probably will only have access to Asian technologies deprived of the Western developments. Further festivals, forums, and summits dedicated to the socio-cultural development of indigenous peoples of the North can be conducted with the participation of non-state organizations, e.g. "International Exhibition-Fair of Achievements in Culture and Traditional Economic Activities of Indigenous Peoples of the North" or the "International Arctic Indigenous Youth Festival"<sup>41</sup>, but cooperation will take place without Russia or with its rather limited participation.

### Scenario 3: "Arctic without borders"

This scenario is based on the slow recovery of the global economy and low conflict in international relations, which for Russia is manifested in the relatively weak sanctions pressure and its return to cooperative formats in the Arctic. This scenario implies significant shifts in the governance system of the Arctic region in terms of institutions. The existing management and partnership mechanisms in the region - the Arctic Council, the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council, the programs of cross-border cooperation between Russia and the European Union, the Northern Dimension, and the University of the Arctic - will continue to function. The Polar Code, which is introduced by the International Maritime Organization and regulates navigation in polar waters, can be promoted in this scenario. Nevertheless, rather weak recovery of the global economy will narrow the opportunities for creating new working groups with a focus on certain problems of socio-economic development of the region and concluding new large-scale sectoral agreements in the short term. Work on already initiated projects will continue, they might be extended, but with a relatively smaller amount of financial support than in scenario 1.

Due to the low sanctions pressure in this scenario Russia may have opportunities to promote its interests and agenda on international platforms in the Arctic. Its inclusion in the activities of key structures in the Arctic - the Arctic Council and the Council of the Barents/Euro-Arctic region will increase the political weight and functionality of these platforms. Moreover, the former economic partnerships can be resumed, and the ones can be established, partially due to slighter impact of secondary U.S. sanctions on Russia's partners. In this regard, Russia will be able to maintain and increase the number of joint projects with China and India in the Arctic region.

The low conflict nature of international relations in general will determine the interest of non-Arctic states in the management of the Arctic, but the slow recovery of the world economy will

41 Small Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic // Arctic Council. URL:<https://arctic-council-russia.ru/events/korennye-malochislennye-narody-arktiki/> (accessed 11.11.2022)



constrain the involvement of non-Arctic countries in the region in the short term and will not create a foundation for their rapid inclusion in international projects in the Arctic. At the same time, the low level of conflict can provide institutional conditions for expanding the membership of the Arctic management system within the framework of traditional institutions in the medium term, which will be supported by a rather close interaction of the Arctic countries. Therefore, as the number of non-Arctic actors in the region increases, the Arctic states will have fewer opportunities to maintain Arctic exclusivity, and given the low conflict nature of international relations, Russia's participation in international cooperation in the Arctic and several preconditions for new non-Arctic actors to get involved into the region, long-term conditions may be set for revising Article 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in favor of expanding the rights of non-Arctic states to conduct activities in polar waters

Due to the slow recovery of the global economy, investments in capital-intensive projects in the Arctic region will be significantly reduced in comparison with the scenarios with a rapid recovery of the world economy from the crisis. Nevertheless, the scenario assumes ample opportunities for socio-cultural cooperation in the Arctic region, technological transfer, research on Arctic ecosystems and Arctic monitoring, which is due to the low impact of sanctions and actors that show interest in exploring climate change in the region being involved in the Arctic governance, i.e., China and India.

#### Scenario 4 "Stagnation in Arctic Cooperation"

In this scenario characterized by a slow global economic recovery and high conflict nature of international relations, weak development of cooperation in the Arctic region is expected, as well as a decline in the effectiveness of multilateral projects, initiatives, and platforms.

International multilateral formats in the Arctic (the Arctic Council, the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council, the Northern Dimension, the Northern Forum, the International Arctic Science Committee, the University of the Arctic, etc.) will be characterized by low functionality caused by the general economic downturn and high level of divergence between states. Existing projects will be put on hold and their implementation will be delayed, while new ones probably will not be implemented. Cooperation with Russia, due to its isolation, also will not take place within the framework of the projects. In addition, due to the weak recovery of the world economy after the recession, cash flows of the Arctic states will be redirected to the recovery of national economies, which will lead to a lack of financial resources for the active development of the Arctic. Funds previously allocated for projects in the region may be partially reallocated if Russia was involved in the projects. If new initiatives are planned, resources for their implementation can be allocated from the budget of suspended projects.

The role of international institutions and platforms will diminish considerably, as there is no opportunity for multilateral cooperation among the Arctic states due to Russia's isolation. In platforms such as the Arctic Council, the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council, and the Northern Dimension, the



participation of all members of the platforms is critical for their successful functioning. Countries will less consider international platforms as a way to address the challenges of sustainable development in the Arctic.

Non-Arctic states will be even less involved in the international Arctic governance than before. Their little interest in participating in international cooperation in the Arctic will be due to the slow economic recovery, the lack of an objective need for new natural resources and transport routes in the Arctic. At the same time, Asian countries' cooperation with Russia in the Arctic will be held back by secondary sanctions from Western countries. The updated U.S. Arctic strategy, which cautiously notes China's involvement in the Arctic, including in partnership with Russia, may be an additional crucial factor that prevents cooperation with the Russian Federation<sup>42</sup>.

Given the reduced functionality of most international platforms, the Arctic Council, whose functions will be reduced to a minimum, could remain the main platform for cooperation in the Arctic. Other international platforms, the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council, Northern Dimension, the University of the Arctic, etc., will probably continue their activities, but with a very limited functionality and a reduced number of projects in which Russia will not take part. Projects with Asian countries will be either suspended, or their implementation, e.g., the Northern Sea Route, will probably turn into a more long-term process, since Russia's role as the main stakeholder may be questioned<sup>43</sup>.

The range of priorities for cooperation in the Arctic region can be significantly narrowed. The countries primarily will cooperate on environmental protection and environmental safety, climate change, sustainable development, science and education, support for the Arctic population, and other acute issues of the region, which are politically-neutral. However, the terms of these activities in these areas will also undergo changes: expensive projects, for example for the infrastructure development, will be reduced, and their implementation will be assumed within a longer time frame than before the crisis. The working groups that previously functioned within the framework of the Arctic platforms will postpone or cancel planned activities, and the list of active working groups' projects can be reduced as well. It is very likely that only those initiatives that have been in place for years and in which Russia is not participating will remain valid. At the same time, the Arctic Council task forces will not be created, as there are not enough financial resources for this because of the slow global economic recovery.

Overall, the high level of political tensions and slow economic recovery may lead to a critical decline in the level and intensity of international cooperation in the region. The role of institutions of interstate cooperation will diminish, as will the effectiveness of the projects themselves within the framework of these platforms. All this may also have a negative impact on solving the region's key problems, which will be partly due to Russia's exclusion from Arctic cooperation formats and the shift of priorities from international cooperation in the Arctic to the recovery of national economies.

42 U.S. announces new Arctic strategy with an eye on China, Russia // NIKKEI Asia. URL: <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/U.S.-announces-new-Arctic-strategy-with-eye-on-China-Russia> (accessed 11.11. 2022)


43 Ibid

## Appendix 1. Scenarios for International Cooperation in the Arctic by 2030 by Key Factors

	S1. «Arctic Reset»	S2. «Isolation of Russia»	S3. «Arctic without borders»	S4. «Stagnation in Arctic Cooperation»
Functionality of International Institutions in the Arctic Region	High functionality of international institutions in the Arctic. An active dialogue is resumed, the main platforms and working groups continue their work, programs and projects within the framework of the Arctic Council, the Barents/ Euroarctic Council, and the CBCs with Russia and the EU also resumed. The AU can be granted the status of an international organization. Russia is getting involved in previous formats and is able to exert influence on negotiating platforms and shape the agenda.	The functionality of international institutions in the Arctic is rather low. New projects are emerging, but not to a large extent and with a limited number of actors. The weight of platforms for cooperation in the Arctic is decreasing due to Russia's isolation. Russia participates in Arctic governance only on a bilateral basis to a limited extent, mostly due to the decreasing motivation of Asian countries to cooperate with Russia.	High functionality of international institutions in the Arctic. However, rapid development and emergence of new projects, initiatives and agreements does not take place. Russia has opportunities to promote its interests on multilateral platforms in the Arctic and to build alternative foreign economic and political partnerships.	Low functionality of international institutions in the Arctic. Russia is being isolated and has no opportunity to uphold its interests on international platforms in the Arctic. In general, there is a decline in the role of international institutions, the role of international cooperation is gradually declining.
Degree of Involvement of Non-Arctic Countries in Arctic Governance Institutions	More non-Arctic countries are getting involved in Arctic governance institutions, new formats and organizations for international cooperation in the Arctic are emerging. Asian states continue to participate in the activities of Arctic institutions in general at the same level, cooperating with Russia due to the reduced effect of secondary U.S. sanctions.	Significant involvement of non-Arctic countries, including Asian countries, in Arctic platforms and formats can be observed as the demand for energy resources and the need for maritime transport routes grow.	Insignificant involvement of new non-Arctic countries in the Arctic governance system due to the weak global economic recovery, but their interest in the Arctic remains because of the region's fragility and global importance. The long-term prerequisites for revising Article 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are being created.	Low involvement of non-Arctic countries amid weak recovery and high confrontation of the global economy.




<p>Degree of fragmentation of the system of management institutions</p>	<p>The fragmentation of the Arctic governance system is minimal. The Arctic Council holds its role as the leading institution in the Arctic. No substantial and functional platforms are created in opposition to the Arctic Council. Russia continues to build partnerships with China and India.</p>	<p>The preconditions for higher fragmentation of Arctic governance in the long term are created due to Russia's isolation and the continued interest of non-Arctic states in realizing the region's potential. Significant domination of Western countries in international Arctic institutions.</p>	<p>Several preconditions for higher fragmentation of Arctic governance are created due to the enhanced opportunities for cooperation between Russia and non-Arctic countries.</p>	<p>Low fragmentation due to lack of objective opportunities and interest of non-Arctic countries in the Arctic</p>
<p>Priorities for Arctic cooperation</p>	<p>Many opportunities for economic, financial, technological, and socio-cultural cooperation. Transport and infrastructure development, renewable energy, and digitization projects are under development.</p>	<p>Multilateral cooperation is limited to environmental protection, including combating climate change and social support for the Arctic population.</p>	<p>Multilateral cooperation in the field of environmental protection goes on, socially-oriented projects are implemented. Due to weak recovery, there are few actual opportunities for large capital-intensive projects and agreements (in infrastructure and mining).</p>	<p>Multilateral cooperation is limited to politically neutral issues of environmental protection, including combating climate change and social support for the Arctic population.</p>



**Arctic Five**

- Russia
- USA
- Canada
- Norway
- Denmark



**Arctic Eight**

- Russia
- USA
- Canada
- Norway
- Denmark
- Sweden
- Finland
- Iceland

# The main international institutions in the Arctic

Arctic council

**Barents  
Euro-Arctic council**



**EU's Cross-border  
cooperation programs**

**Northern dimension**

# Arctic council's structure



## Members

- Russia
- USA
- Canada
- Norway
- Denmark
- Sweden
- Finland
- Iceland

## Permanent participants

- Aleut International Association
- Arctic Athabaskan Council
- Gwich'in Council International
- Inuit Circumpolar Council
- Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North
- Saami Council

## 38 observers

including international governmental and non-governmental organizations

# Six working groups of Arctic council


**Arctic Contaminants Action  
Program (ACAP)**

**Arctic Monitoring  
and Assessment Programme (AMAP)**



# Barents Euro-Arctic council's structure

## Barents Euro-Arctic council



### Intergovernmental

- Denmark
- Iceland
- Norway
- Finland
- Russia
- Sweden
- European council

### Regional

13 regions from different countries

## Working groups

in areas:



Healthcare and social development



Science and education



Culture



Forestry



Environment protection



Indigenous people support



Youth support



Search and rescue on the sea



Tourism



Transport and logistics



Business

# Scenarios of international cooperation development

